Commentary on Feteris by Manley-Casimir, Michael
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 3
May 15th, 9:00 AM - May 17th, 5:00 PM
Commentary on Feteris
Michael Manley-Casimir
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has
been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information,
please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Manley-Casimir, Michael, "Commentary on Feteris" (1999). OSSA Conference Archive. 77.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA3/papersandcommentaries/77
Author:  Michael Manley-Casimir  
In Response To: Eveline Feteris's The Role of Pragmatic Argumentation in
the Justification of Judicial Decisions: Independent or Complementary
Argumentation? 
(c)2000 Michael Manley-Casimir 
At the outset I need to explain that I am not a scholar in the field of
pragma dialectics.  Indeed I was unaware of the existence of this approach to
argumentation until my colleague, Hans Hansen, invited me to act as a
‘commentator’ on this and another  paper at this conference.  He also kindly
sent me copies of two papers “Argumentation as a Complex Speech Act”
(1992) and “Pragma Dialectics and Critical Discussion” (1996) as well as van
Eemeren and Grootendorst’s book  Studies in Pragma Dialectics (1994).  I
must acknowledge that while I have read the papers and dipped into the book,
I still only have a nodding acquaintanceship with the ideas in this field.      I am,
however, interested in the substance of reasoning and especially judicial
reasoning.  So I suspect that the invitation to comment on this paper arose as
much from its focus on judicial reasoning as its focus on pragmatic
argumentation.  Hence my general interest, informed somewhat by my brief
acquaintanceship with pragma dialectics and persisting curiosity about judicial
reasoning, provide the basis for my comments on Eveline Feteris’ paper “The
Role of Pragmatic Argumentation in the Justification of Judicial Decisions: 
Independent or Complementary Argumentation.”
 
In her paper  Feteris sets out to examine whether pragmatic
argumentation can by itself constitute sufficient grounds for the justification of a
legal rule or judicial interpretation, or whether pragmatic argumentation can
only provide an acceptable defense in combination with other arguments.  Her
analysis proceeds in three stages:  in the first she reviews the three main views
respecting the criteria relevant to establishing the validity of a claim–these
include the deontological/moralist approach where pragmatic argumentation
can never constitute a sound defense for a moral or legal decision–here
sufficiency of justification requires arguments grounded in moral or legal
values; the consequentialist/utilitarian/teleological approach where pragmatic
argumentation can, on its own, constitute a sufficient defense; and the pluralist
approach, which combines elements of the moralist and consequentialist
approaches–in this perspective pragmatic argumentation should be
complemented by arguments demonstrating that the decision is coherent and
consistent with accepted rules and principles.
 In the second stage Feteris extends her conclusion that pragmatic
argumentation must always be complemented by other arguments to provide a
sufficient defense of a legal decision and leads her to examine two related
questions: which other arguments and how are these arguments exactly related
to pragmatic arguments?  To do this Feteris turns to schema to display both
subordinative argumentation and coordinative argumentation.
In the third stage Feteris applies her thesis to the analysis of a Dutch
Supreme Court decision, yielding the conclusion that the dominant model of
pragmatic argumentation in the Dutch Supreme Court is akin to an ethical
pluralist approach wherein pragmatic argumentation is used in combination
with or as a supplement to other arguments, and where judges make their
value judgments and the legal bases of their judgments explicit; thereby
permitting an evaluation of the desirability of the results.
 My brief comments begin by acknowledging that I find Eveline Feteris’
exposition lucid, elegant and compelling.  I find the juxtaposition of theoretical
postulates about pragmatic argumentation and schema analysis to be well
integrated and heuristically useful–especially for a novice such as myself in
both pragma-dialectics and legal theory.  Still and necessarily, I have three
questions/observations to raise that may invite discussion or provoke further
research (or may simply be deemed irrelevant!).
 1. Are law and judicial reasoning culturally constructed and thereby culturally
constrained?
It does seem to me that law–however conceptualized–is a cultural
artifact both in terms of its legal propositions, explicit norms, forms and
structure.  What law is in Anglophone Canada, for example, is very much
rooted in the English Common Law tradition and so has similarities in that
respect with other common law jurisdictions; it is also, however, and
increasingly influenced by the impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms as the Charter is invoked and applied in instant cases, and is re-
applied and re-interpreted through the judicial process.  What is arguably
emerging is a distinctive Canadian jurisprudence–influenced by the common
law tradition, informed by the U. S. tradition of constitutional interpretation, yet
adjudicated by judges who–certainly at the level of the Canadian Supreme
Court–strive to interpret and apply the law in a distinctive and culturally
sensitive way.
So, Feteris’ analysis leads me to ask: do justices in the Supreme Court
of Canada use pragmatic argumentation implicitly or explicitly in their
reasoning?  Frankly, I do not know; I am unaware of any analyses of Canadian
Supreme Court decisions that use pragma dialectics as a heuristic.  Yet the
opportunity for conducting similar analyses of Canadian Supreme Court
decisions is clearly provoked by the question and by Feteris’ analysis.
 2. Is pragmatic argumentation part of a judge’s experience and judicial
tradition?
           I am not a judge; nor have I conducted research on judicial reasoning in
Canada with respect to pragmatic argumentation.  But, given Professor
Feteris’ application of schema analysis to the decisions of the Dutch Supreme
Court and her conclusion that the Court seems to use an ethical-pluralist
approach in its decision making, I find myself asking these kinds of questions:
          Is the propensity to use an ethical pluralist approach part of a distinctively
Dutch intellectual and judicial tradition?  Is this approach embedded in how
Dutch judges come to their role and subsequently discharge their role?  Does
Dutch legal practice contain normative expectations about judicial practice that
predispose the Dutch judiciary in this direction?
 3. If not distinctive/exclusive to the Dutch judicial tradition, do we have
evidence that English, U.S. or other European judges use an ethical pluralist
approach in their decision making? 
         If such evidence exists, one would be inclined to wonder whether this
occurs as a function of a broadly ‘western’ intellectual and legal tradition in
which judges are embedded, or whether such an approach is somehow
fundamental to adjudication as a process, which leads to another speculation. 
Would we find such evidence respecting judicial reasoning in non western
societies?   In societies with quite different legal systems, norms and judicial
traditions?  If not, how does judicial argumentation proceed in these societies
and cultures?
At root my questions raise the issue of culture and judicial decision
making versus the intrinsic character of adjudication, and the role of pragma
dialectics in clarifying the way judges in cultures other than the Netherlands
reason.
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